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This essay attempts to assess whether the perceptual issues posed by the contemporary interface 
culture, and the constant attitude shift demanded by the new media between the “natural” and the 
“as if” modes, might be considered a significant challenge for phenomenological aesthetics as 
understood in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. To demonstrate how the 
use of a particular interface profoundly shapes the form and structure of an activity as well as 
enabling perception of a particular kind, the author does not focus directly on the state-of-the-art 
smart interfaces, but describes the experience of cycling in a large city, with the interface in the 
form of the bicycle upgraded with an imagined ride simulator. While the former enables a very 
particular entrance into the world of perception, shaped by its moderate speed and detachment 
from the ground, the latter enables techno-shaped perception in the “as if” screenic mode. The 
experience described raises questions concerning the kinaesthetic, proprioceptive and motor 
features contributing to the cyclist’s mobile perception, as well as pointing to issues related to the 
reading of the city’s network as a particular spatial configuration generated by the cyclist’s real-
time activity. This is the space-time-event-ridescape maintained and modified by the corporeal act 
of cycling. The spatiality of such a ride does not presume the notion of a space that contains the 
cyclist, but builds on notions of being-in-the-ridescape (as a kind of cityscape), in terms not only 
of full corporeal and mental engagement, but also of bodily literacy. The reading of the cityscape 
enabled by the combination of two interfaces, the bicycle and the ride simulator, is discussed in 
relation to de Certeau’s account of pedestrian (walking) experience in a big city, his distinction 
between strategies and tactics, and the notion that each cyclist contributes a novel story to 
ridetext, which is viewed not as an aesthetic object but as the production of puzzles for the rider to 
solve. The paper concludes by questioning the capacity of phenomenology to accommodate the 
contemporary phenomenon of a “mixed” or “augmented reality” either in concept or in relation 




One of the most talked about advances of digital 
technologies is their ability to create a displaced sense 
of place, things and the human, calling into question 
the individual’s everyday embodiment in physical 
settings and destabilizing the ways in which s/he 
connects to the environment and perceives its crucial 
features. To the extent that they form their spatial and 
temporal experiences from a variety of data, users of 
digital technologies experience a mixed reality in 
which virtual (screenic) content comes to be 
integrated with an actual physical environment. There 
is much to be gained from paying close attention to 
the intersection of smart technologies and the human 
user, since it enables novel techno-shaped perceptions 
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which merit investigation. The novel condition of 
simultaneous participation in a given reality and an 
artificial one created by this technology-driven 
cultural turn, and the issues regarding one’s corporeal 
experience within the mixed reality created by 
interface extensions, would seem most appropriately 
approached from a phenomenological perspective. 
 
Investigations into the ontological status of the work 
of art brought phenomenological aesthetics to the 
recognition that the nature of an artwork’s being is 
heterogeneous; for, besides real foreground, the work 
of art also contains a layer of unreal background. 
Analyzing the intentional world of artworks, 
phenomenological aesthetics likewise revealed such 
particular ontological forms as the unreal, quasi-real 
and the as-if-real. No less significantly, phenomeno-
logical investigations also raised the issue of the 
ontological status of the purely artificial as in the 
reality of “impossible” entities such as the centaur, 
the round square, wooden iron, and so forth. The 
being of these entities – as the so-called impossible 
objects – is again quite particular in nature; one could 
say that their ontological status is shifted from that of 
being towards nothingness. The French philosopher 
Jean Paul Sartre, having dedicated his thought 
precisely to nothingness – which is, in a way, 
essential to the being – reached farthest into these 
issues. In his Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre 
distinguishes intermediate stages between fully 
positive realities and those whose positive nature of 
appearance-alike merely conceals the chasm of 
nothingness. It is this very notion that first highlighted 
the existence of reality as comprising the non-being. 
 
Phenomenological interest in these plural-mode being 
structures (that is, objects of art and imagination) is 
not confined to the theorists generally associated with 
the field of phenomenological aesthetics (such as, for 
instance, Roman Ingarden, Moritz Geiger, Eugen 
Fink, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Nicolai Hartmann), 
but was demonstrated also by Edmund Husserl – as is 
evident in the writings from his estate, published in 
Husserliana Vol. XXIII under the title Phantasie, 
Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung (1980). Husserl’s major 
concern in this collection of his writings is with the 
fictional objects of imagination (in German, Fikta) in 
the sense of as-if-real objects, and the specificity of 
unreality. 
 
Nowadays, ontology can still be explored by referring 
to the philosophical tradition extending from 
Parmenides and Plato through to Husserl and 
Heidegger. However, this ontological movement 
could be enriched by analyses of the ontological 
modality of the new-media entities such as the avatar 
(a visual representation of a participant in a shared 
virtual community, and as such an interface for the 
self) and virtual agent. To these, one could also add 
investigations into the plurality of spaces and times 
defining on-line communications and new-media 
activities that fall within the present social networking 
(Web 2.0) interactions. All these factors result in the 
new media1 generating what we shall term “mixed 
reality” as a pluriversum – that is, a reality which 
encompasses both a given reality and a vast field of 
virtual as well as other artificial or synthetic realities. 
The components of this reality are objects, which in 
fact are no longer full and evident entities, but rather 
fluid and dispersed – that is, often only relations, 
actions and data arrangement of a quite provisional 
and instantaneous existence. The key issues here 
centre around the entities which occur in an instant 
fashion and last only as long as certain special 
conditions are being satisfied. The moment that this is 
no longer the case, the entities in question disappear; 
alternatively, they can be erased by pressing a delete 
key on the computer keyboard. New media, defined 
by both classical and second-order cybernetics, thus 
generate relational forms of existence whose being is 
likely to be something between the stable being and 
pure nothingness.  
 
Towards the Mixed Reality and its Ontological 
Plurality 
 
Cyberspace and “cybertime” encompassed within 
mixed reality do not overlap with real space and time. 
This multidimensional spatio-temporality calls for 
comprehensive investigation as well as noetic and 
noematic descriptions of virtual entities as such, with 
these phenomena thus open to a phenomenological 
approach. What is crucial here is the fact that 
phenomenology arises from ontological plurality and 
is therefore sensitized to entities characterized by 
their fragile and instant nature. As Herbert 
Spiegelberg (1960) observes, “What is all-important 
in phenomenology is that we consider all the data, 
real or unreal or doubtful, as having equal rights, and 
investigate them without fear or favour” (p. 892). 
Facing the specificity of in-the-present cyberspace 
phenomena, we are now able to discern not only the 
as-if-real and the unreal, but, in greater specificity, 
also the e-real, the cyber-real, the virtual and the @-
real as artificial modes of digital media generated on-
line as would-be realities which have become to a 
certain extent institutionalized in the 3D virtual world 
Second Life. The present mediascape increasingly 
blurs the boundaries between the given real-as-we-
know-it and the artificial; the latter even appears to be 
the more prominent principle in the mainstream 
                                                 
1 New media include the Internet (today’s trendy Web 2.0 
on which social networking is based), special effects, 
virtual reality, hypertext, digital literature, DVD, web 
sites, computer multimedia, mobile phones, CD-ROMs, 
computer games, digital music (in MP3 and other file 
formats). 
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techno-culture of our media-dominated information 
society. 
 
One of the virtues of phenomenology is its aim to 
bring description as close as possible to the specificity 
of the “thing” in question. By means of the 
phenomenological reduction, and by considering the 
plural nature of objects (given as phenomena), 
phenomenology attempts to disclose with great 
accuracy the special nature of the object under 
analysis, whether real or unreal. The German 
philosopher Eugen Fink, in his investigations into the 
visual medium, has argued that “objects of the world 
of images are not objects in real space, nor do they 
last in real time; they exist merely in the space of the 
world of images and in the time of the world of 
images” (Fink, 1966, pp. 74-75). Given its orientation 
towards disclosing the specific nature of “the thing 
itself”, a phenomenological approach nevertheless 
remains pertinent even in the case of new-media 
objects which derive their existence solely from the 
existence of cyberspace and cybertime within the 
multidimensional spatio-temporal context of the so-
called “mixed” or “augmented” reality. If we think, 
for example, of avatars and virtual agents presented in 
cyberspace (for example, in Second Life), we see that 
they exist only in cyberspace and cybertime, that they 
have only a cyberpast and a cyberfuture, and that they 
can only be the objects and subjects of cyberactions in 
the virtual world. 
 
Vilém Flusser, the theoretician of telematic society, 
pioneered the analysis of specificity in phenomena 
established by new media. In his essay “Technik 
Entwerfen” [Conceiving Technology], in the section 
dealing with the hologram, he remarks that these 
“pseudo-objects established by means of technology 
are no more objects of the kind that can be negated by 
the subject, but rather they are projections, conceived 
from within the framework of a project” (Flusser, 
1998, p. 144). In the case of the hologram cube, he 
draws the conclusion that this is no longer an object 
that stands in space, but rather is immaterial, pure 
appearance, pure “would-being” (Ger. “Sollen”). 
Another example of the phenomenological orientation 
in dealing with the specificity of a particular medium 
is seen in the theory of the work of art as a stratified 
formation (that is, a formation constructed of several 
different layers). This theory was developed by 
Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden, taking into 
account Waldemar Conrad’s seminal essay of 1908 
on the aesthetic object. The work of art is thus not a 
monolithic formation but has a polyphonic character, 
founded on the many-layered nature of its structure. 
 
Life in the contemporary mixed reality fosters the 
emergence of new forms of perception to fit the 
interaction with objects in cyberspace. These objects 
even call for a new sense to be created, namely the 
sense of the virtual, much in the same vein as Karl 
Marx’s notion of the mineralogical sense and the 
sense of beauty. This means that our consciousness 
needs to be cultivated so as to be able to handle the 
objects which we touch and control in virtual and 
other realities in a very subtle fashion. For instance, 
the reader of digital text is identified with the cursor 
in grasping the individual letter of digital text, and 
can thus be said to be in the textscape, where the 
cursor is. 
 
Mixed reality – a term in contemporary new media 
studies which encompasses both the augmented 
reality and the augmented virtuality – is, as a rule, 
accessible via interfaces and can even be spoken 
about in terms of an interface culture (Johnson, 1997). 
Our contemporary culture first and foremost applies 
the new media interfaces which generate special 
matrices, which in turn enable specific access to 
reality: one interface will run a particular movie in 
front of our eyes, while another will confront us with 
“another story”, say, in the form of a computer game. 
 
Furthermore, the use of a particular interface 
profoundly defines the structure and the form of an 
activity. By using a word-processor, for example, a 
text is organized and controlled in a different way 
than if it were penned or typewritten. Interfaces 
enable us to apprehend space and time in formerly 
unknown ways and direct us towards new forms of 
representation. Think, for example, of interactive 
representation (typical of video and computer games), 
which takes us from within the perspective of the 
perfect tense and places us into the imperfect tense, 
referring to the pure present, and from the standpoint 
of an observer to the position of the protagonist, the 
actor. The game, unlike the story, integrates us into 
real-time activities, since it demands exercise, subtle 
hands-on-controls activity, skill and experience. This 
means that it is most persuasive, as it employs all the 
senses – while also creating a new one: the sense of 
the game. Games give us directions as to how to 
achieve mastery under particular conditions and how 
to react quickly in risk situations; but, on the other 
hand, they offer only a limited and – in comparison to 
the narrative quality within the medium of the story – 
an impoverished view of the world, since the view 
has been reduced to the mere goals of the game. 
Games are unmistakably centred around goals and 
motivated by results – all of which have nothing to do 
with the literary story considered as a rich narrative, 
crowded with plots and non-trivial solutions. 
  
Entering the World of Techno-Shaped Perception 
 
Parallel to mixed reality, therefore, emerges, let us 
say, mixed perception, which is shaped through 
advanced interfaces. This means that the perception 
of the contemporary individual is influenced by 
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media, which is why s/he looks, listens and touches – 
metaphorically speaking – in accordance with the 
principles of film, simulation, clicking and hypertext. 
Not only film, but also the new media, crucially 
influence perception, activities and imagination, so 
that the individual – metaphorically speaking – sees, 
hears and touches to a certain extent more and in a 
different fashion than s/he would if s/he did not live 
in the world of interface and software culture. 
 
Various technical goal-oriented activities, enabled by 
the advanced smart technologies, generate certain 
ways of being-in-the-world (even in terms of 
Heideggerian ontology). Raising questions with 
regard to technology means to pose both social and 
cultural questions regarding something essential in 
our primordial existence. New mobile technologies 
profoundly shape the way in which people 
communicate and perceive reality. When we move 
around in our surroundings armed with mobile 
screenic devices, we also perceive the data shown on 
the screen of such a device, meaning that both the 
visual and aural interfaces are integrated with our 
experience of the walking environment. Virtual data 
approaching from a remote context on the screen are 
related to and co-ordinated with our basic, non-
mediated perceptions from the physical here and now. 
The digital technology “becomes a kinetic surface 
which is incorporated in the experience and 
understanding of different places” (Thrift, 2004, p. 
585). We are confronted by a novel human condition, 
in which bodily movement (including walking, riding 
and stopping), real time, visual (also aural and 
tactual) perception of the physical environment, and 
screen-mediated virtual data are integrated. 
 
Such a condition, and the rich experience enabled by 
it, drives users to deploy novel ways of perceiving by 
combining both their tactile activity and ways of 
seeing the world. Referring to one’s ordinary use of 
mobile screenic devices, Heidi Rae Cooley has 
introduced the concept of “tactile vision” to denote 
one’s ability to “see” by virtue of a hand-on-controls 
activity. What is manifest is thus a condition of 
material and dynamic seeing that involves eyes as 
well as hands and the screenic devices as they enter 
one’s nomadic cockpit. With regard to the use of 
mobile screenic devices, Cooley distinguishes 
between “window-ed seeing” (as a practice of looking 
through for instance an aperture or transparent pane) 
and “screenic seeing” as a more physical manner of 
seeing insofar as it involves looking at an opaque 
surface and thus “encourages an experience of 
encounter” (Cooley, 2004, p. 143) by acquiring a sort 
of tangibility. 
 
In the contemporary techno-culture, seeing has ceased 
to be a pure act of contemplative vision of a distanced 
viewer. On the contrary, it interacts with one’s tactile 
activities, enabling a dynamic oscillation between 
visual and tactile feedback. Vision is activated by the 
movement of hand, seeing (and reading) becomes 
tactile, and the new generation of word-images called 
onto the screen by means of navigational devices 
generate a further circle of tactile and kinaesthetic 
activity. Activity of this kind stimulates one’s 
perception and enriches one’s experience as one 
continues to interact with these smart technologies. 
 
Such an approach to techno-shaped experience and 
perception strongly differs from the traditional, more 
critical attitude to the world of perception framed by 
advanced media and technologies. Walter Benjamin 
in his essay The Storyteller (1936/1968) argues that 
“experience has fallen in value. And it looks as if it is 
continuing to fall into bottomlessness. Every glance at 
newspapers demonstrates that it has reached a new 
low …” (pp. 83-84). According to Benjamin, the very 
nature of what is conveyed by information media – 
that “its value does not survive the moment in which 
it was new” (p. 84) – is strongly opposed to the 
richness of the experience derived from the telling of 
a story and the hearing or reading thereof. 
 
Rather than adopting a pessimistic approach to our 
information society, this essay seeks to broaden our 
awareness of the novel media-shaped narratives 
enriching our experience and perceptions. 
 
The Interface Culture Reinvents the Body and 
Reshapes its Perception 
  
Whereas an early phase of cyberculture privileged the 
pure mental operations of a cyborg’s terminal identity 
discussed within the parameters of the mind vs. 
“cyber-mind” problem (for instance, the ideology 
posed by Gibson’s 1984 proto-cyberpunk novel 
Neuromancer), the present Web 2.0 culture, shaped 
by the bridging of the gap between two cultures, 
reinvents the mind/body problem by positioning it 
within the interface culture. Rather than being pushed 
aside or left behind, as it used to be within the 
cyberpunk ideology, the corporeal features of the 
nomadic individual armed with a screenic device are 
becoming more central in terms of reinventing novel 
tasks and functions. The body, as “our basic organ of 
having the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1998, p. 
146), enters the novel ontological condition of the 
present mixed reality determined by the hybridization 
and merging of in-between spaces and times. The 
very nature of mixed reality demands a techno-shaped 
perception, which is enabled through the co-operation 
(and hybridization) of different senses, such as tactile 
vision, tactile hearing, tactile scanning of surfaces on 
the move, not-just-seeing, and so forth. 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion that “the world of 
perception is to a great extent unknown territory as 
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long as we remain in the practical or utilitarian 
attitude” (Merleau-Ponty, 1948/2004, p. 39) makes 
sense in respect of the shift to a more subtle, let us say 
artificial and sophisticated, attitude that enables richer 
perception. I shall attempt to describe phenomeno-
logically, in the form of a first person account, an 
intimate and personal experience of this kind, by 
drawing upon my everyday practice of cycling in my 
home city, Ljubljana – my experience of which is 
enabled through the combination of two interfaces, 
namely the bicycle and a (co-imagined) ride simulator 
(such as can be found in theme parks), and shaped by 
“shifting gears” both physically and attitudinally. For 
me, riding a bicycle is more than simply rolling on 
two wheels. Once my urban ride starts, all that is 
essential in my life is the moment in front of me, right 
now.  
 
Thanks to the combination of a ride in real space and 
a “co-imagined” ride in a simulator on the one hand, 
and the acquired “clicking” sensitivity of a trendy 
computer culture on the other, I can perceive the 
riding space in its complex entirety; which means 
that, in the perceived space, I can switch smoothly 
between the spheres of the real and those of the 
artificial, and, in essence, “enjoy the ride” as such. 
This kind of ride (as a rich temporal event) is founded 
in the everyday experience of the author of this essay. 
In other words, I am going to write about how I view 
the city and what I see in it, now that cycling 
complements both my everyday professional work in 
front of the computer screen and my excursions into 
the trendy environments of the present-day 
entertainment industry (simulator races, SF-movies, 
VR-based games, theme park rides). 
 
I cycle through the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana, the 
city in which I live, in my own way: in the gear which 
demands rather heavy pushing on the pedals. The 
latter, offering crude resistance, reminds me of the 
feedback of the force. I am, myself, uncertain as to 
why I don’t shift gears so as to make it easier, why I 
torture myself in this kind of way, and why, in fact, I 
am so ridiculous; for, pushing the pedals, I keep 
making unnecessary bows of my head. But that’s how 
it is: I have simply got used to cycling through the 
city in my own way. Pushing the pedals of my city-
bike brings to my mind mouse-clicking, say, in front 
of a screen featuring some slow 3-D computer 
animation into which I gradually penetrate by means 
of clicking. I have already pointed out that I push my 
bicycle slowly, so as to feel the feedback of the force 
to the full; it is for this reason that what I see in front 
of me does not open up as a traditional movie based 
on the sensitive chemistry of the film tape. There is 
no speed and no play of city lights involved; instead 
the view opens up for me in the sense of step-by-step, 
even saw-like, penetration within the framework of 
gradual approaching. What is relevant here is in fact 
sequential approaching, progressing to the rhythm 
beaten by the metronome and/or some other digital 
device.    
 
Riding down Miklosiceva Street or Presernova Road, 
I not only cycle on them, but at the same time – 
metaphorically speaking – I also click on them to the 
rhythm of buildings approaching and receding. 
Whenever I cycle, I take the road as an imaginary 
zone-tunnel, simulated by my own perception, which 
ends, say, near Ljubljana’s famous Three Bridges. 
Thanks to the “clicking” pattern of approaching, 
structured in levels and steps, such a tunnel is shaped 
as a telescope tube, offering numerous views across 
the landscape. Slow cycling also allows looking 
upwards and sideways, at the facades and pedestrians 
on the pavements flanking the two rows of buildings; 
and, of course, above all, it allows looking down. The 
cyclist must look down, to the pedals, and forward, a 
little ahead of the handlebar. S/he must also direct an 
intense gaze on the surface of the road and on the 
immediate surrounding terrain: both of which, lying 
at the same level, require looking down. 
 
In my imagination, I complement the ride down a real 
street with a ride through an unreal, “co-imagined” 
tunnel, switching to this mode at the very moment I 
receive a special stimulus. Viewing the surroundings, 
I notice that acceleration causes the facades to be set 
in motion as if to create a movie featuring light-dark 
surfaces with their outlines getting lost. It is at that 
moment that I switch to the “tunnel-mode”. Suddenly 
I notice an agreeable change in the environment under 
observation; this change, caused by my very motion, 
in turn gives rise to a desire/interest that this object-
process-movie-ride should last a long time, so that I 
could, in a way, possess it, and derive extended 
pleasure from its changing. This refers primarily to 
the changes associated with accelerating and 
stopping, and, consequently, to the facades alternating 
between being caught in an interval of a movie and 
re-entering again into the phase of rigidity, re-
composed into a stable form. The “movie experience” 
with the liquid architecture of the street, enabled by 
the interface of the bicycle, but indirectly – in “co-
imagined” analogy – also by the interfaces of the 
computer and the simulator, has been provoked by 
what Ingarden (1969) terms “aesthetic original 
emotion” (Ger. “aesthetische Ursprungsemotion”). By 
this I intend to denote the stimulus which comes from 
the environment and manifests itself in a real object 
as its formal modification. The latter does not inspire 
indifference, but rather an interest in the particular 
superstructure that adorns the perception of the real 
ride through the exploration of an unreal tunnel. This 
impression, gained in the proximity of attractive 
qualities which arise from my perception in motion, is 
in fact only the beginning of the large-scale and 
complex process of aesthetic and kinaesthetic 
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experience accompanying the riding experience. In 
this experience, I combine both modes: a real ride and 
a ride-supplement process in the world (tunnel) of 
images. What counts in all of this is not only the 
pleasure derived from the changes which pave the 
way to an ever more intense tunnel-movie (depending 
on the acceleration), but also the interest in changes 
resulting from stopping, which causes opaque facades 
on both side of the street to reassemble back into clear 
architectural outlines.  
 
I do not merely cycle through the city in terms of a 
simple corporeal activity, because in fact I am 
cycling-clicking through it in terms of the network 
established by both spatial and temporal grammar. 
This means that I do not merely follow an urban street 
network, but I also draw my own loops between its 
threads and nodes: across courtyards, along poorly 
fenced building sites, through narrow passages. I 
make use of the bicycle to benefit from the quite 
special experience of the city’s nearness: to encounter 
its underlying structures and configurations, to look 
across the river and into the canals, to focus on what 
stimulates my proximate senses of touch and smell. 
With my bicycle I stick to those parts of the city 
where the bicycle still belongs, in the sense that there 
it is not thoroughly out of place. The bicycle is not 
like the scooter, the skateboard, or roller-skates on 
which you can speed across the plazas of huge 
shopping malls and between towering skyscrapers. 
The bicycle, to be frank, is actually an old device; it 
does not belong everywhere (like, for instance, LA 
downtown), it does not suit everybody, and some find 
the bicycle downright disturbing. However, the 
bicycle can still function as an interface, and 
sustaining a particular framework (moderate speed, 
moderate detachment from the ground, pushing the 
pedals, the pedals offering sufficient resistance, the 
cyclist bending over the handlebar) it enables a quite 
particular kind of perception. Only the posture and the 
motion of the cyclist provide for the unique 
experience of a “co-imagined” projection tunnel and 
the experience of the city’s buildings as the scenery in 
a 3-D digital cinema. 
 
What kind of buildings are of interest to us? How do 
they outline the tunnel? At this point, I must be more 
accurate: buildings stand sideways, they delimit the 
outer border. Buildings stand, buildings are there; as a 
cyclist, I actually view whatever fills the area between 
the buildings and my eyes, with this area shaped as a 
tunnel network. The latter in fact contains not 
buildings as such, but image-screens softened by 
motion, and full of light and life, getting stuck on the 
nodes of the network. These, however, are not 
momentary stains extended to the point of 
formlessness – we are not, after all, aboard a high-
speed or bullet train (like the French TGV or Spanish 
AVA); the images in the tunnel therefore preserve the 
configurations of doors, windows, ornamental pillars 
and the like, which linger for an interval only to 
extend again at an accelerated pace. 
 
Cycling on roads and paths and sandy trails, I am able 
to watch-in-motion the images within the tunnel 
network. I perceive this network as a particular spatial 
configuration, with the ridescape generated by my 
own activity. This is the space-time-event-ridescape 
maintained and modified by my own cycling. It is one 
space-derivative out of an abundant set. The spatiality 
of such a ride does not presume the notion of a space 
that contains the cyclist, but builds on notions of 
being-in-the-ridescape (as a particular kind of 
cityscape) in terms of full corporeal and mental 
engagement and orientation. It should be stressed here 
that the preposition “in” in the notion of being-in-the-
ridescape does not suggest rough containment; 
instead, its use connotes the sense of “in” as in 
involvement, and should thus be associated with 
being in love and so forth. Moreover, due to its 
mobile narrative structure, which presupposes a 
textual sequence or network of relations, not only can 
I see images and motion – that is, not only do I 
merely follow/read visualized nouns and verbs – but, 
rather, my gaze, enabled by the interface of the 
resisting pedals, also touches, metaphorically 
speaking, the conjunctions and prepositions between 
them. As I cross a section of the cityscape as an 
artificial textwork of relations, I cycle into, and I 
watch to, over, towards, in the direction of, from the 
direction of.  Furthermore, I cycle between and into, 
for, in a sense, I also dive. The space-time-action of 
cycling and/as clicking falls primarily under the 
domain of verbs, conjunctions and prepositions 
(including the temporal before, not-yet and anymore).  
 
Is the virtual space of the tunnel constructed in 
relation to the perception of a cyclist the only feasible 
form in which imagination can enhance cycling 
through the city? Does the augmented gaze emerge 
only via the configuration of the tunnel? Can 
pedalling-as-clicking also be seen from a different 
perspective? It can be. There are areas and spots 
where the city exposes its bowels, or at least its 
wounds, in terms of its dissonant, disquieting 
“uncanny”; that is, where it falls apart and where it is 
being built. Upon such areas I also cast – 
metaphorically speaking – the blanket of the satellite 
orbital gaze needed for the readability of the 
cityscape. What do I mean by that? In this case, the 
whole thing looks as follows: I cycle, and at the same 
time, by virtue of my perspective modified with the 
optics of a satellite camera, I am – above. Cycling 
(say, around building sites, amid ruins, or past the 
sites of fires) I look down as if from a spacecraft 
slowly cruising over an unknown planet, stopping-
clicking each time I push on the pedal, to catch a 
close-up image of some striking configuration on the 
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planet’s surface, say, a crater. My cycling-clicking 
corresponds to a point-by-point crossing of space. 
And it seems that the cycling also brings something 
“more” – an aura, perhaps, or new meaning or 
function  – to the city wounds. 
 
The cyclist’s ride in the cityscape can be discussed 
also in terms of de Certeau’s distinction between 
strategies and tactics and his account of the pedestrian 
(walking) experience in the big city (De Certeau, 
1974/1984). Cyclists are the ones who will visit the 
city wounds (such as the site of a  fire) and make 
them function as hidden spots of the city, because the 
understanding of the cityscape is enriched by the 
reading and re-reading of its dark voids and spots of 
indeterminacy. Cycling is riding and, as such, as 
sequential movement, a kind of sophisticated 
narrative, and thus open to being read and discussed 
in terms of the concepts applied within the 
phenomenology of literature (for instance, Ingarden’s 
and Iser’s notions of spots of indeterminacy and 
voids). Each cyclist brings a novel story to the urban 
narrative. A city is rendered both shapeless and 
senseless without pedestrians, cyclists and car 
drivers. It cannot exist in more than name: because it 
takes people moving and riding through it to turn 
cityspace into a fluid network of places. 
 
The above description of cycling through a city is 
intended as an illustration of how a means of transport 
as traditional as the bicycle enables a particular kind 
of experience and perception, from the very moment 
we start using it as an interface in order to experience 
the environment in a special way. Also, the issue of 
(new) media in general is the issue of technologically 
shaped and accelerated perception; that is, perception 
which is enabled via a particular matrix – or, better, 
through what Heidegger (1954/1977, p. 302) terms 
“enframing” – and which, in the case of the bicycle, is 
fairly specific. It differs distinctly from perception 
pertaining to, say, the fashionable skateboard. The 
defining feature of the latter – reiterating the mouse 
metaphor – is clicking by pushing against the ground 
in a vibrating ride. 
 
It is typical of state-of-the-art interfaces that they are 
increasingly departing from separate, isolated 
functioning; instead, they are being linked up and 
enhanced to form systems. Perception enabled by a 
particular interface thus also becomes intertwined, 
linked, combined with perception enabled by another 
interface. The city as a 3-D digital cinema in the 
cyclist’s experience is cycled-through and viewed/ 
constructed through both interfaces, namely the 
bicycle and the screen, and/or their peripheral 
devices, such as the pedals and the mouse. My 
cycling into the city as a 3-D digital cinema is also 
based on the everyday experience shaped in front of 
the computer screen. Without any clicking, watching 
SF movies with special effects and those employing 
trendy 3-D technology (e.g. the movie, Avatar), and 
without theme-park simulated rides, I would view 
things differently while I cycle, and I would see – in a 
certain sense – less; the cityscape would be the poorer 
for the loss of that tunnel derivative of space which is 
shaped precisely by my ride and which can only exist 
in the spatio-temporally specific event of this same 
ride.  
 
Liquid Switching between Various Modes of 
Perception 
 
The issue which needs to be addressed is how best to 
approach this sort of hybrid experience and 
perception from a phenomenological perspective. 
Could it be that my exploration of the city in the form 
of a cycling-clicking experience refers primarily to 
the mode of perception within the mainstream 
interface culture – and, as such, a mode unfamiliar to 
the world of perception which preoccupied Husserl 
and his successors? Does Husserl provide us, in any 
way, with a phenomenological approach to issues of 
this kind? 
 
Our answer to the latter question is affirmative. Not 
only the texts gathered in Vol. XXIII of Husserliana, 
but also Husserl’s analyses of space and time 
(temporal structures of kinaesthetic sequences in Ding 
und Raum) and of perception are of value in the 
techno-cultural context. Switching to the “as if” mode 
and, consequently, the particular derealization of 
objects and processes, has also been described by 
Husserl himself; even better, they have been 
described in a form which calls for modifications, 
such as I myself have proposed in my account of a 
ride through an unreal tunnel. Husserl not only asserts 
that “Reality can be observed as if it were an 
‘image’”, but that, “In a way, any thing can be viewed 
as an ‘image’” (Husserl, 1980, pp. 591, 593). In the 
context of phenomenology, seeing something as if it 
were an image paves the way to the procedure of 
derealization, and, consequently, to the “as if” mode – 
which ultimately means that the given real becomes 
infected by the “as if” mode. Viewing the world as if 
it were an image, as Husserl explains in his Ideas, 
requires a neutrality-modification of consciousness, 
implying that, in the image, we intend to a reality 
within the mode of “quasi”. Of particular significance 
in the context of this essay is Husserl’s fundamental 
claim that every thing (and therefore not only a thing 
of artistic imagination) can be observed as an image, 
in that it means that every thing can be included 
among the objects of derealization. 
 
If I now return to the description of what I perceive 
while cycling through my home city, I can note again 
that I perceive the streets within a real (or what 
Husserl terms “natural”) attitude, and, at the same 
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time, I also see them as an image. Not, however, as a 
static image in the Husserlian sense, but rather as a 
“movement-image” (Deleuze, 1983), as in film. And, 
in a technoculturally-shaped sense, not only in that 
way, but also as on a theme park simulator’s screen.  
 
The contemporary individual, confronted with the 
mediascapes of interface culture, is clearly urged on 
to observe this reality’s components and processes as 
if they were images, movies, simulator rides or 
computer games. Perceiving the mixed reality, s/he is 
driven to switch to what could be termed the de-
realized image mode.  
 
The question that is raised at this point concerns the 
nature of this switching, as in the changing of 
attitudes, when the user of the reality mode that is 
characteristic for actions in everyday life switches to 
an image mode. We have already mentioned 
Ingarden’s notion of aesthetic original emotion as a 
starting point for the process of aesthetic experiencing 
that leads to reality in a quasi mode. Such a process, 
and implied change of attitude, in the context of 
Ingarden’s phenomenology is understood as some-
thing very demanding and sophisticated. In this 
regard, he writes in The Cognition of the Literary 
Work of Art: “The appearance of the original emotion 
in a person’s stream of consciousness produces, 
above all, a certain check in the preceding ‘normal’ 
course of experiences and modes of behaviour in 
regard to the objects surrounding him in the real 
world” (Ingarden, 1937/1973, pp. 191-192). The 
break of the practical orientation with this check is 
very demanding, in that it leads us away from the 
conditions in which we normally find ourselves, with 
the return to the normal conditions similarly 
demanding. Ingarden describes this in the following 
way: “The return to the concerns of earlier life is 
often accompanied by discomfort, by a feeling of the 
pressing weight of life, from which the original 
aesthetic emotion had, to a certain extent, freed us” 
(ibid., p. 193). In this light, Ingarden’s concluding 
thought about the nature of such switching is not 
surprising: “The transition from the practical to the 
aesthetic attitude is perhaps the most thoroughgoing 
change in man’s psychological attitude” (ibid., p. 
196). 
 
At first glance, Ingarden’s notions can be considered 
of merely historical significance, being embedded in a 
period preceding that in which the (new media based) 
interface culture became part of the mainstream, 
when only rare situations, connected to art 
environments, made the switching off from everyday 
reality possible based on contact with the original 
aesthetic emotion. In contrast, the readiness to work 
in different generations of reality, different worlds 
and different times belongs to the condition of the 
contemporary individual living in the mixed reality of 
the present. Switching among these experiential 
dimensions requires constant reorientation towards 
very particular conscious acts, but it flows fluently, 
without imposing problematically on the individual’s 
psychological life. It would seem as if the 
contemporary individual’s horizon of expectations 
has adapted to the demands of participating in 
ontologically differently founded realities, and that 
s/he is therefore able psychologically to accommodate 
the demands of entering the synthetic spaces and 
times. What we are actually witnessing is a learned, 
routine readiness for such switching, since the 
contemporary individual spends ever-increasingly 
more time in the mode which, to a certain extent, 
resembles the “as if” or the derealized image mode. 
 
When they’re on-line, people constantly 
pass from one form of social activity to 
another. For instance, in one session, a Net 
user could first purchase some clothes from 
an e-commerce catalogue, then look for 
information about education services from 
the local council’s site and then contribute 
some thoughts to an on-going discussion on 
a list server for fiction-writers. Without 
even consciously having to think about it, 
this person would have successively been a 
consumer in a market, a citizen of a state 
and an anarcho-communist within a gift 
economy. (Barbrooke, 2005, ¶37). 
 
Suddenly, various modes of realities and several 
forms of activities are at one’s disposal, everything is 
on the move in a very smooth fashion, and everything 
is accessible as a standing reserve for possible 
manipulations, as demonstrated by the present Web 
2.0 portals and facilitated by very user-friendly 
navigational devices. 
 
But does this constant interchanging of attitudes 
completely coincide with the transition from the 
natural attitude to the aesthetic attitude discussed in 
phenomenological terms? Can it validly be said that 
Husserl’s idea of the “as if” mode infecting reality is 
being realized in the interface culture of mixed 
reality? Does the cyclist on the streets of Ljubljana 
really function as a “virtual phenomenologist”? Is the 
modern hybrid environment of media-ization and 
virtualization a kind of “realm” of pure phenomena 
that follow the radical interruption of the natural 
attitude that is bound to practical goals? 
 
The answers to these questions are in the negative. 
Nevertheless, contemporary experience is elucidated 
by awareness of differences between the current 
media-ization on the one hand and derealization and 
neutralization in the context of phenomenology on the 
other. This trendy media-ization is not a “pure” 
derealization at all, but is based on mixed experiences 
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(Ger. “Gemischte Erlebnisse”) of the kind about 
which Husserl wrote in Husserliana Vol. XXIII. The 
phenomenological device of changing attitudes is also 
a useful one when researching the specificity of 
media-based attitudes. However, the reality of the 
media is not the rigorously pursued reality of the 
phenomenological reduction, but is a hybrid and 
synthetic “hyperreality” – the notion of which, 
extensively developed by Jean Baudrillard from the 
late 1980s into the 1990s, in essence infers “the death 
of the real” in the context of postmodern society’s 
greater connectivity with the “realer than real” or 
“hyperreal”. It is characteristic of this new media-
ized, hybrid and artificial reality that it often tries to 
be more real than the given reality, and this is 
especially the case for virtual reality. And such an 
intention does not fit with the demands of the 
phenomenological reduction, let alone the ends of the 
epoché, driven as it is by the desire to bracket the 
very real – or, let us say, to cleanse the reality to the 
point, in essence, of pure irreality. The (new) media-
generated idea of augmenting and accelerating the 
very drive of reality by deploying various special 
effects is thus at odds with the fundamental aim of 
phenomenology to focus purely on the real.  
 
Contemporary existence is shaped by the new 
interactive media as distinct from the traditional 
media (such as the press, radio, film and television), 
with the promise that by using devices (for example, a 
web camera logged onto the Internet) they will come 
closer to reality-as-we-know-it in a more authentic 
way than the traditional media could. The upgrade of 
the cyclist ride in the co-imagined tunnel described in 
this essay was also prompted by the wish to upgrade 
the reality experienced in the more complex form of 
simulated reality.  
 
In conclusion, we could say that, while the reality of 
phenomenology and the (mixed and hybrid) reality of 
the (new) media are irreconcilable in various respects, 
a phenomenological approach nevertheless enables us 
to raise crucial questions regarding the experiential 
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